Share buy-backs in Germany overreaction to weak signals? : [Version: Dec. 2003] by Hackethal, Andreas & Zdantchouk, Alexandre
 
Share Buy-Backs in Germany 
Overreaction to Weak Signals? 
 
Andreas Hackethal* 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt am Main 
 
Alexandre Zdantchouk 
Freitag Gellert & Co., Frankfurt am Main 
 
First version: Dec. 2002 
This version: Dec. 2003 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the magnitude and the main determinants of share price reactions to buy-back 
announcements of German corporations. Based on a sample of 224 announcements from the period May 
1998 to April 2003 we find average cumulative abnormal returns around -7.5% for the thirty days preceding 
the announcement and around +7.0 % for the ten days following the announcement. We regress post-
announcement abnormal returns with multiple firm characteristics and provide evidence which supports the 
undervaluation signaling hypothesis but not the excess cash hypothesis. In extending prior empirical work, 
we also analyze price effects from an initial statement by management that it intends to seek shareholder 
approval for a buy-back plan. Observed cumulative abnormal returns on this initial date are in excess of 5% 
implying a total average price effect between 12% and 15% from implementing a buy-back plan. We 
conjecture that the German regulatory environment is the main reason why market variations to buy-back 
announcements are much stronger in Germany than in other countries and conclude that initial statements by 
managers to seek shareholders’ approval for a buy-back plan should also be subject to legal ad-hoc disclosure 
requirements. 
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1. Introduction  
In May 1998 the “Corporation Control and Transparency Act” (KonTraG) abolished major restrictions for 
German corporations to repurchase their own shares. In the five years until April 2003, more than 180 
German firms used the new freedom through some 240 share repurchase announcements. 
This paper presents an event study that investigates the magnitude of share price effects from German buy-
back announcements and a regression analysis that explores the determinants of these share price effects. We 
strive to reveal the motives of managers of German corporations to engage in buy-back transactions. 
Moreover, given that the German laws governing share buy-back plans differ in some important respects 
from the corresponding laws in other countries, we examine whether - and if so - why German equity markets 
react differently to buy-back announcements. 
Motives of managers to buy back shares have been extensively discussed in the existing literature (see e.g. 
COMMENT/JARRELL 1991 and STEPHENS/WEISBACH 1998) so that we content ourselves here with a brief 
overview. They can be grouped into two broad categories depending on whether they imply actions that are 
generally expected to be commensurate with the interests of (the majority of) shareholders or not. If positive 
or only insignificant abnormal share price reactions to share buy-backs are observed, motives from the first 
category should be more prevalent and vice versa. 
Motives in line with shareholders’ interest include attempts by management to convey their assessment to the 
markets that their corporation is undervalued. Assuming semi-strong capital market efficiency, managers - 
and in particular those of smaller corporations - can be assumed to have superior information on the prospects 
of their firm as compared to outside market participants. If they are convinced that the market capitalization 
of their company is considerably below the fundamental value attributed to the company based on their 
projections, buy-backs offer an instrument to bet on these projections and thereby to signal the manager’s 
private information to the market. Moreover, low value firms should find it prohibitively costly to mimic the 
behavior of undervalued firms. Otherwise, AKERLOF’S (1970) lemons model would rule out positive price 
responses. If credible, however, the signal should lead to an appreciation of the share price and thereby    
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benefit existing shareholders. Also in line with shareholders’ interest are those share buy-back transactions 
that are financed with excess cash and that take place in jurisdictions where any capital gains induced by buy-
backs impose a smaller tax burden on dominant shareholder groups than dividend payouts. Excess of free 
cash flow gives rise to agency conflicts because managers might otherwise use the cash for negative net 
present value investments like fringe benefit consumption or empire building and thereby harm the owners of 
the firm (Jensen 1986). Although share repurchase announcements might indicate a poor set of investment 
opportunities, they offer management an alternative instrument to dividends to return excess cash to 
shareholders and thereby to reduce principal-agent conflicts. Investors’ prior beliefs regarding the probability 
that managers will actually pay out excess cash should be a positive function of the alignment of manager 
interests with investor interests. Alignment is typically attained through incentive-based manager 
compensation contracts or through the concentration of control rights in the hands of larger blockholders, 
who have stronger incentives to monitor and discipline management than dispersed owners 
(SHLEIFER/VISHNY 1986). As a consequence, repurchase announcements by firms with aligned interests 
should not come at a large surprise to investors. A similar argument applies to situations in which investors 
judge that repurchases are a more tax-efficient means than dividends to pay out an anticipated amount of cash 
to shareholders. The repurchase announcement then only reveals the actual choice by management and again 
does not convey much new information. 
A further reason to buy back shares arises in the context of stock- or option-based compensation plans 
established by the firm in question. It can be safely assumed that the transaction cost related to a seasoned 
equity offer exceed that of a buy-back plan, so that buy-backs are typically a more cost-efficient way to 
obtain the shares to be distributed among employees. Such a buy-back transaction should by itself not lead to 
strong equity market reactions and hence, should not destroy shareholder value because the ramifications of 
the compensation plan can be assumed to be known ex ante. Finally, buy-back announcements might convey 
management’s goal to obtain a tax-efficient currency to finance future growth through mergers and 
acquisitions. Typically, an exchange of shares is more tax-efficient for the target firm than the receipt of cash.    
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This might ceteris paribus – i.e. irrespective of the value potential of the transaction itself – lead to a lower 
price and hence should be considered to be commensurate with the interests of shareholders.  
The second, much smaller, category of buy-back motives includes management’s efforts to repel takeover 
attempts that would actually increase the value of the combined entity but reduce private benefits for 
managers. By reducing cash reserves and at the same time reducing the amount of shares that can be 
purchased by raiders, managers seek to prevent changes in corporate control and thereby to entrench in their 
positions. Managers who undertake buy-backs in defensive situations might hence act solely in their own 
interest and therefore possibly at the expense of shareholders. Another situation in which the interests of at 
least one group of shareholders are violated arises when shares are repurchased at a premium from a specified 
group of shareholders, or more generally, when corporate insiders use repurchases to engage in informed 
trading at the expense of outside shareholders (IKENBERRY/VERMAELEN 1996). Finally, managers who hold a 
substantial equity stake in their firm might launch a repurchase program in an attempt to dilute the control of 
other shareholder groups. Even if these other shareholders are not willing to tender their shares a negative 
value impact might arise from the nontrivial transaction cost associated with the attempt. 
In our study on 224 buy-back announcements we find average cumulative abnormal returns of 7.0% for an 
event window that starts on the day prior to announcement and extends for twelve days, indicating that 
motives from the first category prevail in Germany. A regression analysis based on a comprehensive dataset 
with detailed company information furthermore reveals that abnormal returns are negatively correlated with a 
firm’s size, its market-to-book ratio and the past performance of its shares. We interpret this as strong 
evidence in favor of the undervaluation signaling hypothesis. We also find that abnormal returns are a 
negative function of a variable that attempts to capture investors’ perception whether a given firm is a 
potential takeover target or not. This result indicates that buy-backs as a takeover defense destroy shareholder 
value. In a separate event study we investigate abnormal returns around the date at which the corporation 
launches a public statement that it plans to buy back own shares at some point in the future and that it 
therefore intends to obtain the legally required shareholder authorization for a buy-back plan during the next 
annual general meeting. Cumulative abnormal returns around this initial statement, which typically precedes    
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the actual buy-back announcement by several months, amount to CAR [-5;-5] = 5.2% on average. In 
comparing our results to the existing literature we find that total abnormal returns from planning and 
announcing share buy-backs are considerably higher in Germany than in most other countries. We conjecture 
that the strict German legal ramifications are responsible for this observation. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section gives a brief overview on the legal 
framework governing buy-backs in Germany. Section 3 reviews the extant literature and section 4 describes 
the data we use and the methodology we apply. Section 5 presents and discusses our empirical results. The 
last section concludes. 
 
2. Share Buy-Backs in Germany   
We treat ‘share buy-backs’ or ‘equity repurchases’ as synonymous notions for a transaction through which a 
corporation repurchases some portion of its outstanding shares in the open market or through a tender offer. 
Since the Corporation Control and Transparency Act (KonTraG) became effective on May 1, 1998 German 
corporation have been permitted to buy back common and preferred shares under the following conditions 
and subject to the following requirements, respectively. The volume of shares to be repurchased must 
generally not exceed 10% of nominal share capital
1 and only funds that could have otherwise been paid out to 
shareholders in the form of dividends can be disbursed for repurchase transactions. All shareholders of the 
corporation must be treated the same. The firm must not repurchase its shares for the purpose of trading. 
Repurchases (but not any subsequent sale of repurchases shares) have to be authorized by the annual general 
meeting of shareholders (AGM). The AGM has to decide on the maximum amount of shares to be 
repurchased, on the time horizon over which transactions can take place (maximum of 18 months), and on the 
                                                 
1 Share buy-backs in accordance to section 71 (1) Nr. 6 of the Aktiengesetz (German Stock Corporation Act – AktG) 
that serve the sole purpose of reducing a corporation’s nominal capital are an exception to this rule. A five-percent 
threshold applies to financial institutions trading in their own purposes (section 71 (1) Nr. 7 AktG). The law does not 
specify whether the thresholds apply to the total stock of repurchased shares held in treasury or solely to one 18-month 
period. In the latter case, firms could in principle buy back a substantially higher portion of own shares by obtaining 
AGM approval in subsequent years. For a discussion of this ambiguity see Kraft/Altvater (1998) and Bosse (2000).     
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method of repurchasing, if the corporation does not intend to repurchase through the open market.
2 When 
management decides to actually repurchase shares it is required to announce the decision to the public. There 
is no requirement at this point in time, however, to state the motivation for the decision or to report the 
planned volume of shares to be repurchased. Moreover, German regulators do not deem the announcements 
that a repurchase plan will be proposed to the AGM, nor the approval of such a plan by the AGM as a fact 
relevant for the valuation of securities and hence both incidents are not subject to ad-hoc disclosure 
requirements that were introduced by the 2
nd Financial Market Promotion Act from 1994.
3 Figure 1 shows the 
average number of weeks that elapsed between the three events for the firms in our sample. During the AGM 
that follows any share buy-back transaction, management has to inform shareholders on the motives that 
underlay the transaction, its volume and the price paid per share. Finally, under German law, repurchased 
shares held in treasury are not entitled to voting rights and dividend payouts. As a consequence, dividends per 
outstanding share will ceteris paribus be larger after a share buy-back transaction. 
German legal ramifications for share buy-backs differ along some important lines from US regulations. In the 
US, share repurchase programs do not require approval by the annual shareholders’ meeting but only by the 
board of directors. Repurchasing transactions need not be publicly announced and the periodical transaction 
volume is neither capped by a 10% threshold nor by the amount of funds available for dividend distribution. 
Furthermore, transactions do not have to take place during a specified 18-month time window. 
STEPHENS/WEISBACH (1998) report that it is not uncommon that open market programs spread out over 
several years. Taken together, German firms have less leeway in tailoring a repurchase program to their 
objectives, thereby ruling out, or at least strongly mitigating, the motives that we discussed in the introduction 
as not being commensurate with shareholders’ interests. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
                                                 
2 Existing types of non-open-market buy-backs include: Fixed-price tender offers, where the corporation offers to buy a 
specified amount of shares at a fixed price - typically exceeding current market prices - during a fixed tender offer 
period; Dutch-auction tender-offers, which are similar to fixed-price tender offers, except that prices are set in a book-
building procedure; targeted buy-backs, where the corporation negotiates with a particular shareholder over the purchase 
of a block of shares. For a detailed overview on existing types of buy-back transactions see e.g. Lamba/Ramsay (2000). 
3 However, section 71 (1) Nr. 8 requires management to immediately report the authorization by the AGM to Germany’s 
financial services authority (BaFin).    
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Firstly, the requirement of equal treatment of all shareholders in combination with the obligation to obtain 
AGM authorization for repurchasing shares through tender offers or targeted buy-backs strongly impedes 
wealth transfer from one shareholder group to another. As a matter of fact, a mere four out of the total of 237 
buy-back transactions in our sample were not conducted over the open market.
4 Secondly, because the 
amount of equity to be repurchased is capped at 10% of total capital, the effectiveness of buy-backs as a 
takeover defense device is limited. We hence expect to observe negative abnormal share price effects from 
announcements of share repurchases only in a few cases.
5  
The flipside of the stricter legal ramifications is that managers might feel constrained in signaling private 
information or in disbursing excess cash to shareholders. According to COMMENT/JARRELL (1991), in more 
than a fifth of all US open market repurchases between 1984 and 1989, firms sought to buy back more than 
10% of outstanding shares. The authors also show that this group of firms experienced substantially greater 
average excess returns after buy-back announcements than firms with low-fraction repurchases. Because 
announcements regarding the repurchase volume are neither mandatory nor binding in Germany, it does not 
come at a surprise that the vast majority of German firms in our sample announced that it planned to buy 
back shares up to the maximum amount approved by the AGM. This apparent pooling equilibrium renders 
any non-binding provision of information regarding repurchase volume useless for investors and therefore 
depletes German managers of an extra choice variable.
6 Therefore, only the announcement itself can be used 
for signaling. We argue that German legal requirements and the threat of a reputation loss impose significant 
ex post signaling cost to firms that do not intend to repurchase after an announcement, thus allowing for a 
separating equilibrium in repeated games. Non-repurchasing firms and firms that buy back only a trivial 
amount of their shares must reckon that regulators suspect price manipulation and initiate investigations. 
                                                 
4 Those are AGIV (4-Apr-00, fixed-price tender offer to common shareholders), Friedrich Grohe (7-Oct-99, fixed-price 
tender offer to minority holders of preferred stock), Kögel Fahrzeuge (7-Dec-98, fixed-price tender offer to common 
shareholders) and Krones AG (18-Jan-99, Dutch auction tender-offer). 
5 Further explanations for negative price effects are that the announcement induces investors to reassess the firm’s set of 
profitable investment opportunities or any value-diluting characteristics of stock-based compensation plans. Another 
explanation is of course that unobserved events that coincided with the buy-back announcement confound the 
measurement of share price effects from share buy-backs. 
6 GERKE ET AL. (2002) report that their 156 German sample firms on average only bought back 3.2% of outstanding 
shares. Rational investors will hence use this prior belief when assessing signal strength.    
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Shareholders of these firms will most likely also make inquiries, possibly calling into question the managers’ 
reputation for truthful disclosures. Repurchasing and immediately reselling shares is neither a viable option 
for this type of firms because such behavior would certainly be viewed as trading in own shares, which is 
explicitly ruled out by law. As a consequence, the repurchase announcement allows firms to convey 
information that might induce investors to update their beliefs about the firm’s future prospects and about the 
mitigation of principal agent conflicts regarding the use of free cash flow, respectively. 
 
3. Related Empirical Literature   
The empirical literature on stock buy-backs has so far largely focused on US markets. A number of clear-cut 
results have emerged. Share repurchases lead to significant positive abnormal returns on average, but stock 
price reactions to tender offers are at least twice as large than stock price reactions to open market 
transactions. MASULIS (1980), DANN (1981), VERMAELEN (1981) and COMMENT/JARRELL (1991) found 
abnormal returns from fixed price tender offers well in excess of 10% and an average premium over market 
price of more than 20%. According to Comment/Jarrell (1991) Dutch auction tender offers lead on average to 
an abnormal return of 8% during the three days following the announcement. In contrast, open market 
transaction by US corporations were found by virtually all studies to result in much smaller abnormal returns 
of around 3% (see Table 2). 
The studies cited so far provide strong evidence for the validity of the signaling hypothesis. IKENBERRY ET 
AL (1995) observe a strong negative correlation between the market-to-book ratio before the buy-back 
announcement and the extent of positive abnormal returns thereafter. Abnormal returns were also found to be 
larger for firms whose stocks underperformed the market during the days before announcement 
(STEPHENS/WEISBACH 1998, COMMENT/JARRELL 1991 and IKENBERRY ET AL 1995). Both results reconcile 
neatly with the view that the signaling effects are stronger the higher the potential for an actual 
undervaluation. VERMAELEN (1981) shows evidence that the strength of the signal is also a function of its 
credibility. He discovers that abnormal returns increase in the amount of shares held by management as well    
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as in the repurchased portion of outstanding equity (see also COMMENT/JARRELL 1991 and IKENBERRY ET 
AL. 1995). The more manager wealth is at risk, the more credible is a signal that the firm’s stock is indeed a 
bargain. Finally, the extent of information asymmetries between management and investors also seems to 
have a bearing on signal strength. IKENBERRY ET AL. (1995) document that abnormal returns from buy-back 
announcements decrease in firm size. Arguably, smaller firms disclose less information to capital markets 
and are less researched by institutional investors, rating agencies and equity analysts. Taken together, buy-
backs seem to serve as a credible signaling device for managers who seek to convey to investors that the 
market capitalization of their firm is lower than its true value.
7  
The results for other countries are broadly in line with those for the U.S. Cumulative returns around the 
announcement day are on average strictly positive (see Table 2) and most studies document evidence 
corroborating the signaling hypothesis. 
Insert Table 1 here 
A few studies measured market reactions to announcements of share buy-backs that could be considered to be 
used by management as a device to fend off a hostile takeover. DANN/DEANGELO  (1988), 
DAVIDSON/GARRISON (1989) and DENIS (1990) observe negative abnormal stock price returns and thereby 
corroborate the hypothesis that this type of buy-back transaction violates shareholders’ interests. 
SHOVEN/SIMON (1987), BAGWELL/SHOVEN (1988), EVANS ET AL (2000) and LI/MCNALLY (1999) have 
explicitly tested the validity of the free cash flow hypothesis. They find a positive correlation between 
abnormal returns and measures for excess funds at the discretion of management. They conclude that buy-
backs are an effective means of convincing the market that shirking and investments into poor projects is 
curbed. In addition, STEPHENS/WEISBACH (1998) observe that firms with more excess cash ceteris paribus 
tend to buy back larger volumes of shares, indicating that repurchases serve to reduce excess cash. 
                                                 
7 Further studies that underscore this insight include NETTER/MITCHELL (1989) and BARTOV (1991). WANSLEY ET AL 
(1989) directly assess buy-back motives by means of questionnaires and found that perceived undervaluation was indeed 
one of the most frequently quoted motives.    
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To our knowledge only two empirical studies exist on buy-backs in Germany. SCHREMPER (2000) analyses 
120 buy-back announcements between May 1998 and December 2000 and finds significant abnormal returns 
of around 4%. The sample of GERKE ET AL. (2002) comprises 156 buy-back announcements for which the 
authors find average abnormal returns on the announcement day of 6.1%.  They subdivide their sample to 
measure differences in abnormal returns between a) firms that either belong to the DAX 100 index (+2.7%), 
the Nemax index (+9,0%) or the small cap index (+4,8%), b) firms that either stated undervaluation (+8.9%) 
or the exchange of cash into a superior acquisition currency (+5.2%) as their main repurchasing motive, and 
c) firms that bought back shares during the general upturn of German equity markets between May 1998 and 
February 2000 (+3.7%) and firms that bought back shares during the subsequent bear market (+7.1%). We 
extend the work of both SCHREMPER (2002) and GERKE ET AL. (2002) by using a larger sample size, by 
investigating price effects around the initial disclosure of the intention to buy back shares and by conducting 
multivariate regression analyses on a richer set of independent variables.
8  
 
4. Methodology and Data 
We conduct a standard market-model event study to measure price effects from buy-back announcements. 
Price effects correspond to abnormal returns, or equivalently, excess returns on a firm’s stock on the 
announcement day [0] or over a short time window around that date (e.g. days [-1;+1]), respectively. 
Abnormal daily returns (ARit) are defined as the difference between the observed share price return (Rit) on 
that day and an estimated “normal” daily return (Rit*), which is derived from a market model. We use daily 
share price returns during the time window [-270;-60] and the ordinary least square (OLS) model in (1) to 
estimate the parameters for the market model.  
(1) R it = αi + βi Rmt + εit   for t = -270, -269, … , -60    with   E(εit)=0 and var(εit)=σ
2(εit) 
                                                 
8 Our multivariate analysis shows that the price effect from being listed on a particular market might indeed be spurious 
and rather be driven by firm size. If we include a size dummy into our regression, the coefficient for the market-listing 
variable is rendered statistically insignificant.    
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The estimators and the daily market return were then entered into (2) to obtain the estimated return Rit* for 
share i. 
(2) Rit*= ai + bi Rmt 
The t-statistics from equations (2) and (3) were used to test the Null-hypothesis that abnormal returns on a 
particular day and cumulative abnormal returns for a given period [t; t+n], respectively, are not different from 
zero: 
(3) t  =  ARi/σ(ARi)  with σ(ARi) equal to the standard error of the estimate from (1) 
(4)   t = CARi
i+n/σ(CARi
i+n) with σ(CARi
i+n)=√n • σ(ARi) 
Daily stock returns were computed as the difference between the logarithms of stock prices at market close of 
day t and day t-1. Stock prices were sourced from Datastream. For Rmt we used the broadly defined 
Composite DAX (CDAX) index.   
We conducted a variety of key-word searches on SDC’s M&A database, the news databases of Reuters, 
Bloomberg and Factiva as well as the Ad-hoc Announcements Database of the Deutsche Börse AG in order 
to identify buy-back announcements by German firms, which - by definition - had already obtained AGM 
approval. For the period from May 1, 1998 to April 11, 2003 we found 181 companies with a total of 237 
such individual share buy-back announcements. Figure 2 shows the number of announcements per month. 
The observation that announcements occur in waves points to a conscious timing of the share buy-backs by 
the firms. We can think of two explanations for this phenomenon. Firstly, managers might attempt to improve 
the share price performance towards the end of the company’s financial year in order to produce better 
valuation ratios. Secondly, given that firms do not wait until the end of the predetermined 18-month period 
and given that AGMs typically take place in April or May one should expect the bulk of buy-back 
announcements to occur in the second half of the year. We also searched the database of Germany’s financial 
regulator BaFin (www.bafin.de) for reported AGM approvals of buy-back plans. From May 1998 until April 
11, 2003, 483 corporations sought an AGM approval for a total of 785 buy-back plans. Taking into account 
that buy-back announcements occur on average 21 weeks after an AGM, we arrive at a relevant universe of    
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761 AGM approvals for our sample of 237 announcements. The ex ante average probability that a firm 
exercises its AGM mandate is therefore roughly one third. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
For the empirical analyses of announcement effects we excluded four observations because shares were not 
repurchased over the open market but through tender offers and another nine because coincident confounding 
news such as board changes or windfall profits was released on the announcement date.
9 This left us with a 
total sample of 224 observations for which we measured price effects of share buy-back announcements. The 
same sample was used to investigate the determinants of these price effects by means of regressing abnormal 
returns with the following variables. Table 3 below shows the corresponding descriptive statistics. 
•  MTB: The Market-to-Book ratio is defined as the market value of equity two days before the 
announcement date divided by the book value of equity as reported in the most recent financial 
statements prior to announcement.
10 Low market-to-book equity ratios indicate an assessment of 
investors that the firm in question possesses poor investment opportunities (BAGWELL/SHOVEN 1988). 
We argue that a low ratio tends to increase the perceived potential for an undervaluation of a firm’s stock. 
Signaling by means of announcing a share repurchase transaction might then trigger a reassessment of 
investment opportunities. Lower market-to-book ratios might then be associated with stronger price 
effects. The prevalence of long-term mean reversion in stock returns, which was recently documented by 
MOERSCHEN/SCHIERECK (2003) for the German equity market, might reinforce this relationship. A 
further explanation for any observed negative correlation between MTB and price effects is associated 
with agency conflicts between management and owners. Poor investment opportunities might imply more 
                                                 
9 Only those confounding events have been considered relevant which stood in no obvious connection with the share 
buy-back itself. We assume that price effects from any coinciding news that are directly related to the share buy-back 
such as financial forecasts cancel out on average across the total sample. 
10 Table 5 below shows that MTB is uncorrelated with the cumulative stock price returns over a 30-day interval before 
the announcement date. We therefore assume (and we will verify this assumption in the next version of this paper) that 
using the market value on day -2 before the announcement date as the nominator of MTB does not distort our regression 
results.    
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financial slack, so that the decision by managers to pay out excess cash is especially welcomed by 
investors in these situations. 
•  SIZE: Firm size is expressed by the logarithm of its enterprise value. Enterprise value is defined as the 
sum of the market value of equity and the book value of interest bearing debt.
11 Size is treated as a proxy 
for the extent of information asymmetries between a firm and the capital markets. The larger a firm, we 
argue, the more information is publicly available due to more stringent disclosure requirements and 
stronger analyst coverage. Ceteris paribus, buy-back announcements that serve the purpose of signaling 
an undervaluation should convey more information to investors in the case of smaller firms. 
•  NMLISTING: This dummy variable is set to 1 if the firm was traded on the Neuer Markt - a by now 
abolished listing segment of the German stock exchange for young and innovative firms.  Like SIZE, 
NMLISTING also serves as a proxy for information asymmetries between the company and its investors. 
Firms listed on the Neuer Markt are typically characterized by shorter track records and a higher degree 
of uncertainty regarding future industry prospects than more mature firms listed on other exchange 
segments. As a consequence, signals should be stronger for Neuer Markt firms. 
•  PASTRETURN: This variable measures the cumulated absolute returns of a firm’s stock over the 30 day-
period prior to our event window [-31;-2]. The worse the performance, the larger is arguably the potential 
for undervaluation and the more might therefore the market treat buy-back announcements as credible 
undervaluation signals. We use absolute returns instead of abnormal returns, because we expect both, 
management’s assessment of undervaluation and management’s timing of an undervaluation signal to 
depend on the experienced absolute change in share price rather than on the relative change.
12 
•  UNDERVAL: This dummy variable is set to 1 if a firm states “undervaluation” as a main motive for 
repurchasing own shares. Although German firms are not legally obliged to disclose their motives for 
share buy-backs, it is common practice that they provide such information in the press release which 
contains the repurchase announcement itself. Out of the 224 firms in our final sample, 185 disclosed their 
                                                 
11 We refrained from subtracting the cash position from debt value to avoid negative enterprise values for some firms.  
12 Using cumulative abnormal returns instead leaves our empirical results virtually unchanged.    
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motives.
13 In many cases, more than one motive was stated. Table 2 below reports the total number of 
declarations and the percentage of firms per type of motive. 96 or roughly one half of the firms stated a 
perceived undervaluation of their stock as one reason to buy back shares.
14 Because the cost for the firm 
associated with this statement is virtually zero, the statement should actually not be a credible signal to 
the market. Hence we would expect to observe no difference in announcement effects between firms 
stating different motives. 
Insert Table 3 here 
•  CASH: This variable is defined as the amount of liquid assets over the book value of equity. It is used as 
an – albeit weak – measure for the amount of free cash that is at management’s disposal. If free cash flow 
is large, investors might welcome share buy-backs as a means of avoiding management consumption of 
private benefits. 
•  CONTROL25, CONTROL50 and CONTROL75: These dummy variables are set to 1 if the portion of 
combined holdings of the two largest shareholders in a firm’s total outstanding shares lies in a specific 
range. Control25 is 1 for holdings greater or equal to 25% and below 50% of total shares outstanding. 
CONTROL50 is 1 if holdings are greater or equal 50% and smaller than 75%. CONTROL75 is 1 if 
holdings are 75% or greater.  We thereby attempt to measure any price effects that might arise from a 
firm’s specific governance structure.  If a firm is controlled by only a few large blockholders, minority 
shareholder have to fear that large blockholders exercise their power in their own interest, e.g. by 
inducing the firm’s management (which might actually be identical with or at least closely related to 
blockholders in the case of manager- and family-controlled firms) to transact with them at favorable 
terms or to invest in projects that one-sidedly benefits them.
15 If the extraction of private benefits by large 
                                                 
13 UNDERVAL was set to zero for the 39 firms that did not specify their motives. 
14 In the Canadian sample of LI/MCNALLY (1999), more than two thirds of the 183 firms stated undervaluation as their 
main motivation. 
15 EHRHARDT/NOWAK (2002) show in their empirical analysis that private benefits for family blockholders can indeed be 
very large in German firms and that stocks of firms, where founding families own more than 75% underperformed their 
peers significantly over a three-year period. NENOVA (2003) finds that the value of corporate voting rights, which can be 
interpreted as a lower bound for actual private benefits of the controlling shareholders was more than twice as high in 
Germany than in the US in 1997.    
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shareholders is indeed prevalent, one should expect larger abnormal returns for firms with concentrated 
ownership. In these cases, buy-backs imply an unexpected payout of cash that might have already been 
written off by minority shareholders. 
•  TARGET: We introduce this dummy variable to test whether investors’ perceptions that a buy-back 
transaction might primarily be used to fend off a takeover lead to lower abnormal returns. Since we 
cannot observe investors’ perceptions directly, we searched for constellations where share repurchases 
bore the potential of reducing the free-float down to a level that would have made it difficult for raiders 
to accumulate a controlling stake over the open market and where managers and family owners, 
respectively, had a substantial but non-controlling equity stake in the firm. In these constellations, 
management and owner families may fear that outside raiders take over control of the firm and 
subsequently curb any existing opportunities for incumbents to extract private benefits from the firm. We 
set TARGET to 1 if the free float was smaller than 25% and if the combined stake of managers and 
family owners was between 25% and 50% shortly before the announcement date.
16 
•  FINANCIAL and SERVICE: We introduced two industry dummies to control for industry effects. 
FINANCIAL is 1 if a firm belongs to the financial services sector and SERVICE is 1 if a firm belongs to 
all other service industries, respectively. For firms from the manufacturing industry both dummies are set 
to zero. 
Insert Table 3 here 
We did not collect data on the volume of shares actually repurchased after the announcement. That is because 
this information was not available to investors at the announcement date and therefore should not have an 
impact on share price. Another variable, for which we tried to collect data is the fraction of shares that was in 
                                                 
16 Because managers affiliated with the owner family might carry a different surname, we were not able to distinguish 
between managing families and pure owner families. Another weakness of the TARGET dummy is that the filtering rule 
implicitly assumes that a raider can only buy shares from minority shareholders but not from other non-family and non-
manager blockholders. However, because TARGET is equal to 1 only for 8% of the observations, the subset of falsely 
categorized observations is arguably quite small.    
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the hands of the firm’s managers and their families. Unfortunately, however, it was not possible in the 
majority of cases to identify whether managers were indeed associated with any owner family.
17 
 
5. Empirical Results  
Abnormal Returns on the Announcement Date 
Figure 3 below plots average abnormal stock returns for the 224 observations in our sample.  Day zero marks 
the respective event date at which firms announced to repurchase shares over the open market. The average 
abnormal return on this day is 4.9%, with 78% of the sample firms showing positive abnormal returns. 
Average cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date are even larger: roughly 6% for the time 
window [-1;+1] and almost 7% for the time windows [-1;+5] and [-1;+10], respectively.
18 All return figures 
are significantly different from zero at the 1%-level, implying that announcements incorporate information 
effects. Moreover, Figure 5 indicates that share prices of sample firms experienced a conspicuous abnormal 
downward trend over the 30 trading days before the event date. COMMENT /JARRELL (1991) document a very 
similar pattern in their analysis of some 1,200 US open market repurchase programs. Announcements are 
preceded by negative net-of-market stock performance and positive excess price effects reverse about half of 
this underperformance.  
Insert Figure 3 here 
Regression Results 
Table 4 presents the results of a multivariate regression analysis for three different dependent variables and 
two different model specifications. The full model includes all twelve independent variables. For the reduced 
model we have dropped three variables that are strongly correlated (correlation coefficients exceeding 0.25 – 
                                                 
17  The simple approach to map the names of managers with the names of shareholders surely substantially 
underestimates the true extent to which managers (and their families) have a stake in the firm. Therefore it did not come 
at a surprise to us that such a narrowly defined variable of manager ownership did not carry a significant coefficient in 
any regression model of this paper. We hence dropped the variable altogether. 
18 The percentage of sample firms with positive cumulative abnormal decrease with the length of the event window: 
73% for [-1;1], 72% for [-1;5] and 66% for [-1,10].    
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see Table 6 below) to one or more of the other variables. Aside from the industry dummies, seven variables 
feature at least weakly significant coefficients in one or more specifications. Price effects from buy-back 
announcements are on average greater for firms with lower market-to-book ratios (MTB), for smaller firms 
(SIZE), for firms listed on the Neuer Markt (NMLISTING), for firms that experienced lower share price 
returns prior to announcement (PASTRETURN) and for firms that stated undervaluation as a motivation for 
the share repurchase (UNDERVAL). For the other variables results are more ambiguous. The coefficients of 
both CONTROL25 and CONTROL50 are negative but not significant. The coefficient of CONTROL75 
always carries a positive sign but is only weakly significant for the reduced model and CAR[-1;1]. Price 
effects from buy-backs that are potentially perceived as a takeover defense device are virtually zero on the 
announcement day but strongly negative (and slightly significant) when measured over a two- or eleven-day 
observation period (TARGET). Finally, the amount of cash on a firm’s books does not seem to affect share 
price reactions at all (CASH). 
We interpret these results as strong evidence for the validity of the signaling hypothesis. Investors seem to be 
more willing to update their beliefs regarding a firm’s future prospects, if the potential for an undervaluation 
of the firm’s equity is greater and if the signal is more credible. Above, we argued that this tends to be case if 
past share price returns and market-to-book ratios are low and if information asymmetries between managers 
and investors, which themselves can be assumed to be a negative function of firm size, are large. The fact that 
past absolute (and also past abnormal) share price returns explain announcement effects indicates a deliberate 
timing of the announcement by management
19, supporting the view that firms use buy-backs to signal 
undervaluation. 
Surprisingly, statements by managers that they view their firm as undervalued also seem to have measurable 
effects on abnormal returns. Cumulative abnormal returns between day -1 and day +10 are on average more 
than five percentage points higher for firms that made such a statement. Because the statement itself is 
                                                 
19 Given a deliberate timing, one should not observe too many instances, where the steep abnormal decline in stock price 
that potentially triggered the buy-back announcement had been pre-empted by one or more intervals with similarly 
negative returns. We are currently analyzing the entire history of abnormal returns following the AGM approval and will 
report the results of this analysis in the next version of this paper.    
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virtually costless and therefore can be assumed to lack credibility, we are inclined to treat this result very 
cautiously. We rather suspect that unobserved firm characteristics that are correlated to the variable 
UNDERVAL are responsible for this result. 
Insert Table 4 here 
The negative coefficients of the TARGET variable provides some, albeit very weak evidence for a negative 
relationship between abnormal returns and the perception by investors that a buy-back transaction aims at 
fending off a (potential) hostile takeover. The fact that coefficients for TARGET are only negative for wider 
event windows and only statistically significant for [-1;10] points at a large degree of initial uncertainty 
regarding the true motives of management that can only be resolved after (time-consuming) further 
investigations. 
Insert Table 5 here 
We find no evidence corroborating the free cash-flow hypothesis. In the last section we argued that low 
market-to-book ratios in conjunction with large cash positions might indicate financial slack on a firm’s 
books. Share repurchases reduce financial slack and thereby potentially mitigate agency problems between 
managers and owners, which should have a positive impact on share prices. Although MTB carries the 
expected sign in Table 4, we do not observe any clear relationship between abnormal returns and a firm’s 
cash position. In an extended model specification we also analyzed the explanatory power of a newly defined 
variable MTB/CASH. Again, coefficients were statistically insignificant. 
The ownership structure of a firm - as captured by the three CONTROL variables – does not seem to have a 
measurable bearing on abnormal announcement returns. The positive and weakly significant coefficients of 
CONTROL75 might hint at mounting expectations by minority shareholders that they will get squeezed out 
by majority owners in the near future. If minority shareholders anticipate receiving a premium over market 
price at that future date, price elasticity can be expected to be even higher.    
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We were not able to test the validity of the tax-efficiency hypothesis which presumes that a firm should 
distribute excess cash through share repurchases if dividend payouts implied a higher tax burden to its 
shareholders. As a consequence of recent German tax reforms, corporate income tax rates on retained profits 
have converged to tax rates of distributed profits.
20 Given that capital gains are tax-free after a minimum 
holding period of 12 months, households in higher tax brackets should have preferred share repurchases to 
dividend payouts. Therefore, tax efficiency might indeed by an important motive of managers to repurchase 
shares. However, because rational investors should expect managers to select a tax-efficient pay-out policy, 
the tax-related information content of the actual repurchase announcements should be fairly limited. 
Abnormal Returns from Statements by Management to seek AGM Approval for a Buy-Back Plan 
Given that buy-back announcements lead on average to strong abnormal price reactions, any prior event that 
implies a substantial increase in the probability that such an announcement will eventually occur should also 
affect share price. The intricacies of German laws governing buy-back plans give rise to such a prior event, 
namely the initial statement by management that it will seek AGM approval for a buy-back plan. In this 
section, we first estimate the magnitude of abnormal returns at that early stage and then compare our estimate 
to the empirical evidence. 
Price reactions (RA= 1+rA) at the early date A, at which a firm publicly states its intention to seek AGM 
approval, should be a positive function of the expected abnormal share price appreciation on the later 
announcement date B (RB=1+rB) and the probability p that investors assign to the actual future occurrence of 
a buy-back announcement. Taking on the perspective of investors who want to identify the maximum share 
price appreciation RA at which it is no longer worthwhile to buy the stock in question, we can write
21 
(5) RA = p (RA RB) + (1-p) 1 . 
Collecting terms and solving (5) for RA yields 
                                                 
20 Since 2001, all profits of a corporation - irrespective of whether they are retained or paid out in the form of dividends 
– are taxed at 25% at the corporate level. Half of the dividend income of shareholders is tax-free and the other half is 
subject to personal income tax. 
21 For the sake of simplicity we implicitly assume risk neutral investors and a discount rate of zero.    
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(6) RA = (1-p) / (1-p RB) . 
From section 4 we know that only roughly one third of all firms that sought AGM approval actually 
announced a buy-back transaction during the subsequent 18 months. Setting p = 1/3 and RB = 1.07% (see 
Figure 5 above) yields an estimate for RA of 1.036. One should therefore expect to observe average abnormal 
returns of roughly rA=3.6% when new information about a firm seeking AGM approval arrives on the market. 
To verify this estimate we performed a new search in the news- and ad hoc databases mentioned above to 
find initial statements by firms that they are about to seek AGM approval for a buy-back plan. To avoid a 
selection bias, we did not restrict ourselves to the 181 firms that subsequently announced a repurchase 
transaction. This new search strategy yielded over 300 observations. However, we had to drop the majority of 
observations because the sought-after statements were part of a more comprehensive disclosure of multiple 
statements by the firm in question and because it was impossible to pinpoint the exact date of the statement, 
respectively (e.g. because the statement was part of the invitation letter to the AGM). The final sample 
comprises 111 observations that are fairly evenly distributed across the observation period. We then re-
applied the methodology from section 4 to plot average abnormal returns around the date A. Figure 4 below 
shows that the average rA is larger than 5% for most event windows and therefore exceeds our estimate of 
3.6% considerably. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
We offer three explanations for this discrepancy. Firstly, abnormal returns might be distorted by confounding 
events on dates A and B, respectively, or by a selection bias regarding the observations for date A. Secondly, 
investors might have been overly optimistic regarding the true probability that an initial statement to seek 
AGM approval for a buy-back plan will indeed be followed by a later announcement to repurchase shares. On 
the same token, one might also call into question the credibility of such an initial statement, because the only 
cost to be incurred by firms that send a false signal are reputation losses. The third explanation assumes that 
investors behave rationally and that signaling is indeed costly. If this holds true we must have so far 
overlooked additional events C in the interim period between dates A and B or after date B that are associated    
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with positive abnormal returns on average. The AGM approval and any actual open-market buy-back 
transactions are candidates for these missing events. By solving (5) for the implied RB and dividing RB by the 
observed abnormal return RB’=1.07 on date B we can estimate the expected average abnormal return (RC) for 
these missing events. 
(7)   RC = (RA - 1 + p)] / (p RA RB’) 
Entering RA=1.05, p=1/3 and RB’=1.07 into equation (7) yields RC=1.024. Given that the third explanation is 
correct, the total cumulative abnormal return from implementing a repurchase plan amounts to RA * RB’ * RC 
– 1 = 15.0%. Given that the second explanation is correct (no omitted event), the implied total return 
decreases to RA * RB’ = 12.4%. Compared to the results of event studies for other countries (see Table 1), this 
average price effect from open-market share repurchases by German firms is remarkably high.  
We can only speculate why this is the case. Information asymmetries between managers and (outside) 
investors might be larger for German firms than for firms from market based financial systems such as the 
US or the UK. LEUZ/WÜSTEMANN (2004) show in detail that the role of the German accounting system is not 
so much to disseminate information to the capital markets but rather to support private information channels 
to privileged inside investors like “Hausbanks” and blockholders. Empirical studies indeed show that the 
information content of financial statements is less value relevant and less timely than in the US or the UK
22. 
As a consequence, additional public disclosures by German firms might embody relatively more relevant 
information content than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. If the extent of information asymmetries were indeed 
the main determinant of country differences in announcement effects, one should in turn expect to observe 
similar differences in abnormal returns from announcements regarding other financing decisions of firms. 
However, GEBHARDT (2001) documents in his overview on selected empirical studies that neither 
announcements of changes in dividend payouts nor announcements of seasoned equity offers seem to result 
in higher market variations for German firms than for US firms. 
                                                 
22 See e.g. JOOS/LANG (1994) and HARRIS ET AL. (1994).    
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We therefore conjecture that the strict German legal provisions that govern the entire buy-back process from 
the ex ante obligation to obtain AGM approval to the ex post obligation to disclose the details of any 
transactions on the subsequent AGM provide for a higher credibility of buy-back announcements as 
undervaluation signals than in the US context. In the US, investors can only infer from buy-back 
announcements that firms intend to repurchase own shares. Investors cannot deduce, however, any obligation 
by the firm to imminently engage in a repurchase transaction. Further research should investigate whether 
other countries with high observed abnormal returns (such as Japan) possess legal ramifications that are prone 
to enhance any undervaluation signal from buy-back announcements. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes share price effects from buy-back announcements of German corporations and thereby 
largely confirms the empirical results of prior US and international event studies. We also observe high 
negative pre-announcement abnormal returns and high positive abnormal returns during the days after the 
announcement. Moreover, the results from our regression analysis tend to corroborate the undervaluation 
signaling hypothesis. Firm-specific
23 variables such as market-to-book ratio and firm size, which attempt to 
capture the potential for undervaluation and potential information asymmetries between managers and 
outside investors were found to be closely related to the magnitude of price effects. We find no evidence in 
support of the excess cash hypothesis, according to which firms repurchase shares with excess cash in order 
to alleviate agency conflicts. 
The legal requirement that German corporations must first obtain shareholders’ authorization before 
repurchasing shares allows us to also analyze another, preceding event in the buy-back context, namely the 
initial statement by management to seek shareholders’ authorization. Also for this second event, we find 
                                                 
23 In a separate regression not reported in the last section we tested whether the undervaluation signal contains any 
relevant industry-wide information. For that purpose, we constructed a set of weighted share price indices. Each index 
covered the entirety of C-DAX firms from a particular industry but not the one firm that announced a buy-back. For the 
announcement date of a given firm, we then measured abnormal returns for the corresponding industry index. The 
average abnormal returns that we obtained were statistically not different from zero, thus largely ruling out industry-
wide effects.    
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highly positive abnormal share price reactions. The fact that implied total abnormal returns from 
implementing buy-back plans seem to be extraordinarily high when compared to share price effects observed 
for other countries poses a research puzzle. We conjecture that differences in the legal requirements for 
conducting buy-back programs are the main determinant for international differences in average price effects.  
Our empirical result regarding strong price effects on the announcement date reinforces the legal requirement 
for German firms to report an imminent buy-back transaction by means of a public ad-hoc disclosure. Given 
that the preceding, initial statement by managers to seek AGM approval also causes considerable market 
variations, we are inclined to suggest that such a statement should also be subject to legal ad-hoc disclosure 
requirements. Otherwise, opportunities remain for trading by informed insiders which was prohibited back in 
1994 by the 2
nd Financial Market Promotion Act. Figure 4 above shows positive abnormal returns in the five 
days before the concerned voluntary statement, thus indicating that insider trading might indeed be an issue in 
this context. 
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Figure 1:  Time line of share buy-backs in Germany (N=224) 
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Table 1:  Prior empirical results on abnormal returns from announcing open-market 
repurchase programs (OMR) 
Country Study  Abnormal  Returns  Dataset 
U.S.   McNally (1999)  CAR [-1;+1]: 2.3%  451 OMR (1985-1988) 
  Vermaelen (1981)  CAR [-1;+1]: 3.7%  243 OMR (1970-1978) 
  Stephens/Weisbach (1998)  CAR [-1;+2]: 2.7%  591 OMR (1981-1990) 
  Ikenberry et al (1995)  CAR [-2;+2]: 3.5%  1.239 OMR (1980-1990) 
  Comment/Jarrell (1991)  CAR [-1;+1]: 2.3%  1,157 OMR (1985-1988) 
Canada  Li/McNally (1999)  CAR [-2;+2]: 3.6%  183 OMR (1989-1992) 
  Ikenberry et all (2000)  CAR [-15;+15]: 0.9%  1,060 OMR (1989-1997) 
Germany   Schremper (2002)  CAR [-1;+1]: 4.1%  112 (mostly) OMR (1998-2000)  
  Gerke et al (2002)  CAR [-1;+1: 6.1%  156 OMR (1998-2000) 
U.K.     Raghavendra et al (2002)  CAR [-5;+5]: 1.1%  264 OMR (1985-1998) 
  Oswald/Young (2002)  CAR [-1;+1]: 1.4%  266 (mostly) OMR (1995-2000)  
  Lasfer (2000)  CAR [-2;+2]:  1.6%  465 (mostly) OMR (1985-1998) 
France    Ginglinger/L’Her (2002)  CAR [-1;+1]: 0.7%  363 OMR (1998-1999) 
Brazil   Moreira/Procianoy (2001)  CAR [-1;+1]: 0.03%  110 OMR 1997-1998)   
Japan   Zhang (2000)  CAR [-1;+2]: 6.0%  39 OMR (1995-1999)   
Australia   Lamba/Ramsay (2000)  CAR [-1;+1]: 3.3%  103 OMR (1989-1998)   
  Otchere/Ross (2000)  CAR [-1;+1]: 4.3%  132 OMR (1991-1999)   
Korea   Jung (2003)  CAR [0;+5]: 2.8%  382 OMR (1994-1998)  
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Figure 2:  Share buy-back announcements in Germany (May/1998 – April/2003)  
00
1
000
1
2
3
1
2
11
3
7
5
8
5
7
8
3
7
2
3
4
9
8
3
6
7
8
7
2
0
6
5
4
6
12
88
5
4
3
11
2
5
2
8
77
44
11
3
4
11
0
5
10
15
M
a
y
-
9
8
J
u
l
-
9
8
S
e
p
-
9
8
N
o
v
-
9
8
J
a
n
-
9
9
M
a
r
-
9
9
M
a
y
-
9
9
J
u
l
-
9
9
S
e
p
-
9
9
N
o
v
-
9
9
J
a
n
-
0
0
M
a
r
-
0
0
M
a
y
-
0
0
J
u
l
-
0
0
S
e
p
-
0
0
N
o
v
-
0
0
J
a
n
-
0
1
M
a
r
-
0
1
M
a
y
-
0
1
J
u
l
-
0
1
S
e
p
-
0
1
N
o
v
-
0
1
J
a
n
-
0
2
M
a
r
-
0
2
M
a
y
-
0
2
J
u
l
-
0
2
S
e
p
-
0
2
N
o
v
-
0
2
J
a
n
-
0
3
M
a
r
-
0
3
1998: 4 2000: 67 1999: 51 2001: 63 2002: 43  2003: 
9 
 
 
 
Table 2: Motives  for share buy-backs as declared by management (N=185) 
       
   Number of 
declarations 
Percent of 
185 sample firms 
Acquisition currency    107  58% 
Undervaluation  96 52% 
Employee participation programs  32  17% 
Cancellations/pay-outs to shareholders  27  15% 
Other   5  3% 
       
Sum   267   
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Table 3:  Descriptive statistics (N=224)  
           
  Dependent variables    Independent variables    Independent dummy variables 
  AR[0]  CAR 
[-1;1] 
CAR 
[-1;10]    MTB SIZE  PAST 
RETURN  CASH     Averages     
                              
Max. 40.6%  36.8%  56.5%    14.80  11.55  49.6% 125.3%                 
Min. -13.6%  -18.5% -36.6%    0.18 1.76  -71.8%  1.3%   NMLISTING  0.43    TARGET  0.08 
Avg. 4.9%  6.0%  7.0%    2.55 5.49  -11.1%  39.3%    UNDERVAL  0.43    CONT.25  0.33 
Median 3.1% 4.6%  5.0%    1.71  5.06 -7.6% 32.1%    SERVICE  0.29    CONT.50  0.35 
Stdev. 7.8%  9.4%  14.3%    2.78  2.10 21.2% 30.4%    FINANCIAL  0.13    CONT.75  0.11 
                                  
 
 
Figure 3: Average cumulative abnormal returns from buy-back announcements 
(N=224) 
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                         Note: t-statistics in parentheses 
 
AR [0]  =  4.90%  (19.58) 
CAR [-1;+1]  =  5.97%  (15.90) 
CAR [-1;+5]  =  6.82%  (10.30) 
CAR [-1;+10] =  6.99%  (8.07) 
CAR [-30;-2] =  -7.54%  (-5.59)    
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Table 4: Multivariate regression analysis (N=224) 
                      
    AR[0]     CAR[-1;1]     CAR[-1;10]     AR[0]     CAR[-1;1]     CAR[-1;10] 
                      
CONSTANT 11.56%***    11.73%***    15.20%***    11.57%***    12.68%***    13.52%*** 
 (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.003)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
MTB -0.51%***    -0.45%**    -0.69%**    -0.44%**    -0.38%*    -0.63%* 
 (0.005)    (0.038)    (0.038)    (0.016)    (0.076)    (0.052) 
SIZE   -0.94%***    -1.01%***    -1.31%**    -1.01%***    -1.13%***    -1.26%*** 
  (0.001)    (0.004)    (0.013)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.006) 
NMLISTING 2.93%***    2.40%*    2.25%             
  (0.010)    (0.077)    (0.275)             
PASTRETURN  -3.28%    -7.60%***    -13.86%***    -4.17%*    -8.19%***    -14.43%*** 
  (0.177)    (0.010)    (0.002)    (0.082)    (0.004)    (0.001) 
UNDERVAL 0.89%    1.80%    5.05%***    1.32%    2.06%*    5.52%*** 
 (0.380)    (0.142)    (0.007)    (0.192)    (0.088)    (0.003) 
CASH 0.07%    1.51%    -0.54%             
  (0.966)    (0.460)    (0.862)             
TARGET 0.21%    -3.25%    -5.80%*    0.35%    -3.26%    -5.80%* 
 (0.909)    (0.151)    (0.092)    (0.852)    (0.146)    (0.087) 
CONTROL25 -2.10%    -1.44%    -3.02%             
  (0.159)    (0.419)    (0.267)             
CONTROL50 -1.43%    -1.31%    -2.09%             
  (0.336)    (0.463)    (0.442)             
CONTROL75 0.22%    3.02%    2.35%    0.92%    3.40%*    3.86% 
  (0.910)    (0.196)    (0.509)    (0.568)    (0.077)    (0.184) 
SERVICE -2.80%**    -3.63%***    -4.69%**    -2.67%**    -3.48%***    -4.74%** 
  (0.014)    (0.008)    (0.024)    (0.018)    (0.010)    (0.020) 
FINANCIAL -2.25%    -3.00%    -3.69%    -3.04%**    -3.57%*    -4.30% 
  (0.148)    (0.108)    (0.194)    (0.048)    (0.051)    (0.120) 
                             
                
Adj R²  0.173    0.171    0.171    0.155    0.166    0.177 
F Stat  4.901    4.826    4.826    6.100    6.556    6.998 
Significance F  0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000 
                              
Notes: Reported results are OLS regression coefficients with p-values in parentheses. 
            *** significant at least at the 1%-level, ** significant at least at the 5%-level, * significant at least at 
the 10%-level 
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Table 5: Correlation matrix for independent variables (N=224) 
                      
  
MTB  SIZE   NM 
LISTING 
PAST 
RETURN 
UNDER 
VAL  CASH  TAR 
GET 
CONT. 
25 
CONT. 
50 
CONT. 
75 
SER 
VICE 
SIZE   0.19                 
NMLISTING 0.01  -0.34                 
PASTRETURN  0.01  0.11  -0.05              
UNDERVAL -0.08  -0.12  0.16 -0.06               
CASH 0.01  -0.22  0.25 0.07  -0.04            
TARGET -0.07  -0.17  0.16 -0.05 0.06  0.02           
CONTROL25 -0.02  -0.09  0.13 -0.10  -0.04  -0.04  0.05       
CONTROL50 0.01  -0.23  0.11 0.02 0.05  0.05  0.14  -0.52      
CONTROL75 0.00  -0.05  -0.18 -0.01 -0.07  -0.13  -0.10  -0.27 -0.25    
SERVICE -0.05  -0.23  0.22 0.08 0.00  0.05  0.00  0.15 0.05 -0.06   
FINANCIAL 0.11  0.13  -0.28  -0.02 -0.07  -0.21  -0.11  -0.08 -0.11 0.21  -0.24 
                                     
 
Figure 4: Average cumulative abnormal returns from statements to seek AGM 
approval for a buy-back plan (N=111) 
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AR [0] = 1.47% (4.86)
CAR [-1;+1] = 2.53% (4.84)
CAR [-1;+5] = 2.87% (3.59)
CAR [-5;+5] = 5.21% (5.19)
CAR [-15;+15] = 6.89% (4.10)
 
                     Note: t-statistics in parentheses 
 